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PCAOB Inspections:
Perceptions of Triennial Firms with No-Deficiency Inspections
ABSTRACT
The drive to enhance audit quality after the cascade of audit failures in the final decades
of the last century and first two years of the new century resulted in a new structure for
the oversight of public accounting firms. The Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board (PCAOB) was established with the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.
This Board was given the authority to inspect all public accounting firms who provide
audits to publicly-owned companies reporting to the Securities and Exchange
Commission. Such public accounting firms were required to register with the PCAOB.
Accounting firms who audit more than 100 clients per year are required to undergo a
yearly inspection; firms who audit 100 or fewer clients undergo inspections at least once
every three years and are referred to as triennial firms.
No firms that are inspected yearly have to date received a deficiency free inspection
report. However, some of the triennial firms have had deficiency free reports. It is this
sub population of registered companies -- the triennial firms -- that is the topic of this
paper. Furthermore, the interest here is limited to inspection of the auditing process of
the firm; there is no attention to quality control, which constitutes a separate assessment
and conclusion.
A simple, relatively brief survey inquiry questionnaire was designed to obtain the
opinions of a key person in the sample of firms chosen at random. Questions asked for
reasons for their deficiency-free inspections, opinions related to the value of inspections,
the role of the PCAOB, and their interest in increasing the number of SEC reporting
clients they serve. The questionnaire was accompanied by a covering letter.
Executives of 41 (35.6 percent) of the 115 to whom requests were mailed responded.
Among the findings were: A. Factors perceived critical for achieving no-deficiency
audits accepted by the respondents were: 1. Systematic, timely and thorough review
process; 2. Level of knowledge/skill of the total audit team and; 3. audit partner’s skill
in team leadership. B. A majority of respondents concurred the reasons for deficiencies
were 1. inadequate review process, 2. weaknesses in knowledge of relevant GAAP and
3. audit partner leadership skills inadequate. Other conclusions are included in the
report.
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PCAOB Inspections:
Perceptions of Triennial Firms with No-Deficiency Inspections
The drive to enhance audit quality after the cascade of audit failures in the final decades
of the last century and first two years of the new century resulted in a new structure for
the oversight of public accounting firms. Among the changes were: accounting firms.
providing audits to clients reporting to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC),
(1) were required to register with the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
(PCAOB) and (2) had to undergo inspections of their auditing function and their quality
control programs. These requirements are stated in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
which established the PCAOB. That Act stated the general nature of the Board’s
responsibilities for inspections of registered public accounting firms:
The Board shall conduct a continuing program of inspections to assess the degree
of compliance of each registered public accounting firm and associated persons. .
. with this Act, the rules of the board, the rules of the Commission, or professional
standards, in connection with its performance of audits, issuance of audit reports,
and related matters involving issuers. (Sarbanes-Oxley, Section 104)
The Act also set the frequency of inspections stating that
(A) annually with respect to each registered public accounting firm that regularly
provides audit reports for more than 100 issuers, and (B) not less frequently than
once every 3 years with respect to each registered public accounting firm that
regularly provides audit reports for 100 or fewer issuers. (Sarbanes-Oxley, Ibid.)
Inspection reports relate to both auditing and quality control programs. Deficiencies
found related to auditing are identified in the publicly-disclosed inspection reports posted
at the PCAOB website. If no deficiencies are discovered in the inspection of audits
performed, the report includes this information.
Weaknesses in quality control are not noted initially in the publicly-disclosed inspection
reports. However, if there are no problems related to quality controls the publiclydisclosed report will include a note about this matter.
Most inspected registered firms have received inspection reports with deficiencies noted.
(Deficiencies are referred to as Issuer A, issuer, B, etc; names of audit clients are not
identified in the publicly disclosed reports at the PCAOB Website.) None of the ten
firms that audit over 100 clients has received to date (as of late March 2008) a nodeficiency report. However, there are some firms among those that audit 100 or fewer
companies reporting to the SEC that have had deficiency-free reports.
Olson, the Chairman of the PCAOB in testimony before the Committee on Small
Business of the House of Representatives noted the importance of small registered firms
by stating:
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. . . of the 1,000 plus domestic audit firms that are registered with the PCAOB, the
overwhelming number are small firms. . . . While our experience in inspecting
these firms [the triennial firms] varies, we are reassured to discover that many
very small firms provide high quality audits for their clients, many of whom are
small businesses. (Olson,, 2007)
It is this sub population of registered companies -- the triennial firms -- that have
deficiency-free reports that is the topic of this paper. Furthermore, the interest here is
limited to inspection of the auditing process of the firm; there is no attention to quality
control, which constitutes a separate assessment and conclusion. It is true that there is
in reality an overlap between the two components of inspections. Indeed, many quality
control problems identified have been related to the auditing process and audit
conclusions of the firms. The overlap and interrelations are worthy of study but are
beyond the scope of this exploratory survey investigation.
A simple, relatively brief survey inquiry questionnaire was designed to obtain the
opinions of a key person in the sample of firms chosen at random. Questions range from
perceptions of the reasons for their deficiency-free inspections, opinions related to the
value of inspections, the PCAOB to their interest in increasing the number of SEC
reporting clients they serve. The questionnaire was accompanied by a covering letter.
In the remaining parts of this paper, the following topics are discussed: 1. The
Inspection Process; 2. Extent of Inspections Completed; 3. Criticism of the Inspection
Process; 4. Methodology and Limitations of the Survey; 5. Responses from Triennial
Firms; 6. Review of Literature; and 7. Summary and Reflections on Responses.
1. The Inspection Process
From the initial functioning of the PCAOB, the Board determined that a supervisory
approach would be the strategy for determining compliance with rules and audit
guidance. Inspections began in 2003 with limited inspections of the largest 4 U. S. public
accounting firms. Then in 2004 inspections began for registered accounting firms of all
sizes. At the conclusion of each inspection, a report is prepared that is submitted to the
SEC and to the inspected accounting firm. Additionally, there is a publicly disclosed
inspection report that is posted at the PCAOB Website.
The Nature of an Inspection
The inspection process has been designed to encourage public accounting firms to
maintain a high quality auditing process through an inspection of both auditing policies
and practices and quality control programs. The goal is to enhance the quality of audits
through identifying and addressing weaknesses and deficiencies related to how the firm
under inspection conducts audits.
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The overriding question for the inspectors is: Has this firm adhered to the rules and
practices of auditing in the performance of audits of publicly-owned companies?
Failures that are identified as deficiencies are described by the PCAOB as “only those
deficiencies that, in the inspection team’s judgment, resulted in the firm failing to obtain
sufficient competent evidence to support its opinion on the financial statements.”
(PCAOB, Report on the PCAOB’s 2004. . . . )
There is no established strategy that is used for all inspections. The inspectors for a
particular inspection determine which audits are selected, and what aspects of those
selected will be reviewed. Through the review of such aspects, the inspectors “may
identify ways in which a particular audit is deficient, including failures by the firm to
identify, or to address appropriately whether the financial statements are fairly present the
financial position, results of operations, or cash flows of the issuer in conformity with
GAAP.” (Each inspection report includes this statement or a similar one.)
Inspectors review audit documentation for those audits selected and also interact with
staff in discussions about what is being inspected. Changes in what is to be done, in
some instance, are made as the inspection proceeds.
Each inspection report states:
It is not the purpose of an inspection, however, to review all of a firm’s audits or
to identify every respect in which a reviewed audit is deficient. Accordingly, a
Board inspection report should not be understood to provide any assurance that
the firm’s audits, or its issuer clients’ financial statements, are free of any
deficiencies not specifically described in an inspection report. (See an Inspection
Report at the PCAOB Website for this paragraph or a similar one.)
Limitations in Conclusions Drawn from an Inspection Report
Conclusions from an inspection report are limited. There is no basis for a judgment about
audit quality in the particular registered firm under inspection. Furthermore, there is no
basis for determining of audit quality of all the inspected firms or a subgroup of inspected
firms. The unique, or custom, design of each inspection precludes any overall
generalizations about audit quality. Each inspection report states that there is no basis for
supporting any negative inference in this standard paragraph that is found in each
inspection report:
The express inclusion of certain deficiencies and potential deficiencies, however,
should not be construed to support any negative inference that any other aspect of
the firm’s systems, policies, procedures, practices, or conduct is approved or
condoned by the Board or judged by the Board to comply with laws, rules, and
professional standards. (See an inspection report for this statement)
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Each inspection report informs the reader that “any references . . . to violations or
potential violations of laws, rules, or professional standards should be understood in the
supervisory context in which this report was prepared.”
Therefore, the question can be raised: “Why be concerned about triennial firms that have
no-deficiency inspection reports if there is no basis for judging the firm?” “Is it not
appropriate to conclude simply that those who have no deficiencies have “done
something right,” if only partially?
Also, since the Board has chosen a supervisory approach, there is a possibility that
receiving a report that indicates that the firm’s inspection revealed no deficiencies is an
incentive to maintain high standards for audit engagements. If deficiencies are disclosed,
will such information motivate firms to reduce the incidence of deficiencies in the future?
At this point, the preceding paragraph is merely identifying potential hypotheses for
future investigation. This exploratory survey of firms with deficiency-free inspection
reports provides merely some opinions and reflections on the experience of heads of
triennial firms about the topics included in the survey.
Information Provided about the Firm and the Process
Information in the publicly-disclosed inspection reports is not identical from one
inspection report to another. In general, the reader does find some information about the
firm and some about the process.
Information about Each Firm
Inspection reports identify the number and location of offices, the nature of ownership
structure, number of partners, number of professional staff and number of issuer audit
clients. However, the latter number – number of issuer audit clients -- is noted to be the
number provided by the registered firm under inspection. The inspectors do nothing to
verify the figure provided.
Some information is not provided including who is responsible for the management and
oversight of the auditing function and the quality control function. If there has been a
merger or split in the firm, there is no reference to such change. There is no
identification of the persons with whom the inspectors interacted. However, the
respondent was asked to identify his/her position. There is no information about how
any challenges to deficiencies are reviewed and what resolution, if any, is reached.
Information about the Process
Information is provided about the period during which the inspection took place;
however, it is not sufficiently detailed so the reader does not learn the number of
inspectors involved or how many hours were spent in field work. Additionally, there is a
general reference to the offices of the registered firm that were included in the inspection.
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In most reports, there is reference to the number of audits involved in the inspection, but
there is no explanation why, for example, 2 audits of the 5 were inspected in one instance
while in another instance all of the 4 audits of SEC reporting clients were inspected.
For firms with deficiencies, there is provided a general discussion of the deficiencies
found. An example of the explanation for a firm where the audits of all 3 issuers were
included in the inspection report that included deficiencies is the following:
The scope of the inspection procedures performed included reviews of aspects of
the performance of all three of the Firm’s audits of the financial statements of
issuers. Those aspects were selected according to the Board’s criteria, and the
Firm was not allowed an opportunity to limit or influence the selection process.
The inspection team identified matters that it considered to be audit deficiencies.
The deficiencies identified in two of the audits reviewed included deficiencies of
such significance that it appeared to the inspection team that the Firm did not
obtain sufficient competent evidential matter to support its opinion on the issuer’s
financial statements. Those deficiencies included the failure to perform and
document adequate procedures related to the existence of plan investment in two
of the audits reviewed. (See Inspection of Dannible & McKee LLP, May 11,
2006 at PCAOB Website)
As noted earlier, if there are no deficiencies related to auditing, the inspection report will
include a paragraph that so states. The statement below is from the second inspection of
the same Firm (where there were no deficiencies) noted in the preceding excerpt from the
Firm’s first inspection report. While the firm continued to report that it had 3 issuers, in
the second inspection, only one issuer’s audit was inspected. The statement quoted
about no deficiencies is typical of the statement found in most such inspection reports:
The inspection procedures included a review of aspects of the Firm’s auditing of
financial statements of one issuer. The scope of this review was determined
according to the Board’s criteria, and the Firm was not allowed an opportunity to
limit or influence the scope. This review did not identify any audit performance
issues that, in the inspection team’s view, resulted in the Firm failing to obtain
sufficient competent evidential matter to support this opinion on the issuer’s
financial statements. (See Inspection of Dannible & McKee, LLP, October 23,
2008 at PCAOB Website)

2. The Extent of Inspections Completed
The PCAOB issued a report on the PCAOB’s 2004, 2005, and 2006 inspections of
domestic triennially inspected reports. The Report included some details about the extent
of inspections through 2006 of accounting firms that audit no more than 100 issuers each
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year. These firms are referred to as “the triennial firms” since they are subject to
inspections at least once in every three calendar years. The report stated that
91 inspections were performed during the 2004 inspection cycle, 257 inspections
during its 2005 inspection cycle, and 149 inspections in 2006 cycle, for a total of .
497 inspections. (However, as of October 2007, there were 439 reports issued;
58 were yet to be issued.). Of the 439 reports on the first inspections of U. S.
triennial firms issued to date (through 2006), 124 (approximately 28 percent) did
not identify any audit performance deficiencies. . . . (PCAOB, Report on the
PCAOB’s )
A footnote in the above noted PCAOB Report indicated the extent of domestic registered
firms were inspected: Approximately 4 percent had from 51 through 100 issuers; six
percent had from 26 through 50 issuers; twenty-seven percent had from 6 through 25
issuers and 62 percent had five or few issuer audit clients. (Ibid. )
The last available Annual Report of PCAOB is for 2007 (as of April 10, 2009). This
Report noted that for the year 2007, PCAOB inspectors reviewed 461 audit engagements
performed by the 10 firms that had audited more than 100 issuers in 2007 and 574 audits
performed by the 226 other firms inspected. (Inspection reports of the 10 firms reveal no
information about the number of audits inspected in each audit.) However, the figures
provided in the 2007 Annual Report provide a basis for calculating averages: For those
auditing more than 100 clients, the average is 46 audits per firm; for the triennial firms,
the average was 2.5.
The average for triennial firms is reasonable given that in the first three years’
inspections, 62 percent of the inspections were of firms with five or fewer issuers.
Actually, there were a few inspection reports that noted “none” for number of issuers that
were explained as firms that had ceased to be a client’s auditor so a prior audit of the
client was reviewed to determine effectiveness of the firm’s auditing policies and
procedures.
Role of the PCAOB’s Office and Research and Analysis
As noted in the Annual Report for 2007, the Office of Research and Analysis (ORA)
assists “in selecting audit engagements and identifying the risk areas within each
engagement that might be reviewed.” Additionally, the ORA provides research notes
and training on complex accounting issues and trends in the market. For the year 2007,
training was related to “fair value accounting, accounting treatment of subprime
mortgage securities and resulting audit issues.”
The Inspection Staff
Experienced auditors are hired to serve as inspectors. In 2007, the inspection team
leaders responsible for large firm inspections had had 23 years of relevant experience.
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The average for inspection team members averaged 15 years of relevant experience.
These inspectors are located in the several branch offices of the PCAOB.
Budget Allocated for Inspections
It is not surprising that an oversight agency allocates considerable resources to
inspections. The actual expenditures for inspections in 2007 were $54.944 M (43.74
percent of total budget); in 2008 budgeted expenditures were $64,573 M (44.65 percent
of total budget) and for 2009 the budgeted expenditures are 68,753 M (43.62 percent of
total budget) The extent of increase between actual expenditures for 2007 and budgeted
expenditures for 2009 is essentially the same. (Increase in total budget is 25.4 percent,
while the increase in expenditures for inspections is 25.13 percent) (PCAOB Budgets for
2007 and 2009)
Where Inspections are Performed
Initially all inspections were on site. However, more recently some inspections are
performed in PCAOB offices throughout the United States. In 2007 the PCAOB
performed 44 percent of its inspections of the 179 U. S. firms from PCAOB offices,
which are located in Atlanta, Chicago, Dallas, Denver, New York, San Francisco, Los
Angeles and Washington, DC.
The Annual Report for 2007 noted that “while not appropriate in every case, where they
make sense, these PCAOB office-based inspections save time and money for both the
PCAOB and the firm. (See comment on office inspections on page 19, Related to
Statement 3)
3. Criticism of the PCAOB Inspection Process
Although inspections have been underway since 2003 (with the initial inspections of the
big four firms only limited in scope), there has not been disclosed any serious assessment
of the effectiveness of the process. An interesting paper suggesting needed changes is
one by Glover, Prawitt and Taylor. The abstract includes the following:
Although we acknowledge the benefits brought about by SOX, some of the
problems that we outline are attributable to PCAOB choices that are not vetted
publicly. In our view the Board’s ability to achieve its mission is severely limited
by its early choices, together with its incentives, organizational composition and
structure. We believe fundamental changes are needed in the areas of inspections
and standard setting. ( Glover, et.al.)
Concern about the sufficiency of the process was discussed by an experienced
auditor, McDonnell, who noted:
The PCAOB made it clear the profession must regain the public’s
confidence or face severe censure. But the board’s decision to use an
inspection process to perform its oversight creates a high-risk environment
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for the profession. In a February 2004 speech at the Economic Club of
Chicago, McDonough said the PCAOB inspection process would consist
of reviews of audit engagements to ensure compliance with securities
laws, the rules of the SEC and the PCAOB and the highest professional
standards.
Unfortunately, experience shows this approach provided little assurance
of mitigating the risk of audit failure. Even though such reviews were an
integral part of the internal quality control programs of audit firms for
years, they weren’t very effective in preventing audit failures. Why would
the PCAOB’s experience be any different? When I visited the PCAOB
several months ago and posed that question to George H. Diacont, the
PCAOB’s director of registration and inspections, he answered, “We’ll do it
better.” (McDonnell)
A similar concern about the adequacy of the overall process was noted by Alles
et.al. who noted:
Given its ambitious agenda to extend inspections beyond the Big 4, the
PCAOB should reflect on its experiences during both the 2004 and 2005
inspection programs and evaluate its procedures. For example, are the
inspections structured so they will help restore the credibility of the audit
function? More importantly, will the PCAOB’s inspection process uncover
the underlying auditing and reporting problems that led to the creation of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act? Probably not. (Alles, et al.)
Ciesielski noted the extent of inspections implied in SEC Chairman Cox’s
testimony in mid September (2006) by quoting Cox commenting about the SEC’s
concern about audits being done without wasted time and effort:
We anticipate that the SEC staff’s next inspection of the PCAOB will focus
on the PCAOB’s own inspection program for registered audit firms. In
particular, the staff will likely focus on the PCAOB’s inspection of audits
under PCAOB Auditing Standard No. 2. . . .we hope to achieve greater
compliance with the Commission’s and the PCAOB’s own guidance that
these be risk-based and cost-effective. (Cox’s words as quoted in
Ciesielski, The AAO Weblog)
Gullapalli, in a Wall Street Journal article reported, after talking with companies
who had the results of their limited inspections, that:
In general, the companies [interviewed for the article] dub the change
superficial and say it didn’t have anything to do with their fundamentals. . ..
Still however small the dollars in these particular instances may be, some
accounting specialists see the accounting board’s close look at this
relatively obscure rule [reference to requirement in Emerging Issues Task
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Force Issue No. 95-22: “Balance Sheet Classification of Borrowings
Outstanding under Revolving Credit Arrangements.”] as a possible
preview of more stringent rule enforcement in general. (Gullapalli)
Johnson noted that the “second round of official inspection reports related to the
Big Four audit firms” led to a “handful of negative headlines” which may reflect
the inadequacy of the shared information as well as the fact that the reports are
for past periods and do not truly reflect how the audit firms are currently
performing. As Johnson stated:
Using the terms “failed” and “failure” numerous times, the PCAOB cited
the firms for basic accounting issues, some of which relate to lease and
tax accounting, revenue recognition, and goodwill-impairment testing. All
four of the reports, and the PCAOB’s previous evaluations of the Big
Four’s work, noted that in some instances the firms did not “identify or
appropriately address errors in the issuer’s application of GAAP.”
(Johnson, Why the Big Four . . . )
Leone noted that the 2005 inspections of two of the big four that were issued in
early January 2007. She commented:
. . . one report identifies 10 companies for which audits were deficient,
and says that in ‘some cases’ the errors appeared ‘likely to be material to
the issuer’s financial statements.’ The other report identifies 11 deficient
audits, and says that in ‘one case’ the result is likely to be material.
(Leone)
Leone noted that neither auditor changed any of its audit opinions as a result of
the PCAOB report or the completion of further procedures.
In responses to questions posed in an E-mail to Charles Niemeier, a PCAOB Board
member, a “behind-the-scenes” look was provided. In response, for example, to the
question: What do the 2005 inspections reports on the Big Four tell us about the audit
firms?, Niemeier stated:
. . . they are intended to focus firms on the areas where they can improve.
. . . I feel comfortable saying the firms have come a long way in identifying
and addressing risks to their audit quality, as a part of our inspections as
well as on their own. (Johnson, O&A: The PCAOB’s Charles Niemeier)
A Google search (early January 2009) revealed no empirically driven assessment of the
effectiveness of the inspection process. There is support for the efforts of the PCAOB.
There is generally a realization that oversight is required. The support for what is
expected, for example, is highlighted in an award winning paper by Wegman, who noted:
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While parties coming before the PCAOB can assert their legal rights in the
enforcement process, they should be mindful that the Board’s “supervisory
approach” affords them an opportunity to work constructively with the Board.
The Board much prefers to preserve public accounting firms rather than to see
them fail. In almost all cases a firm will be better off taking advantage of the
Board’s supervisory approach rather than by aggressively contesting the Board’s
determinations. After all, both the Board and the profession share the common
goal of providing the best possible financial information to decision makers. By
working constructively with the PCAOB, public accounting firms can best serve
their clients and themselves and attain the high standards to which their profession
aspires. (Wegman)
Wegman’s expectations are appealing. Now, such expectations need to be transformed
into hypotheses and empirically investigated.
4. Methodology and Limitations of the Survey
Triennial firms that received no-deficiency inspection reports were identified by reading
the inspection reports posted at the PCAOB Website, under the heading “Inspections” as
of early November.. There were three groups identified: 1. Firms that had had one
inspection only and it was reported that there were no deficiencies. 2. Firms that had had
two inspections and both were reported to have no deficiencies, and 3. Firms that had
had two inspections, with the first one containing deficiencies and the second was
deficiency free. (There were no firms listed at the time of the sample selected that had a
no-deficiency first inspection and had deficiencies in its second inspection.)
Sample Selection
From the list of such firms (listing revealed 251 firms with one or two inspections
without deficiencies as of November 18, 2008), a random sample of 115 firms was
selected with no attention to whether they had had one or two deficiency free inspections.
At the time of questionnaire analysis, though, the original sample selected was classified
into the three groups: One no-deficiency inspection: 54 firms; two no deficiency
inspections: 24; and two inspections, with deficiencies in the first one; no deficiencies in
the second: 37 firms. A tally of responses by these three categories did not show
significant variations, so there were no separate analyses of the three subgroups.
The selection was from triennial firms only inasmuch as none of the 10 firms that audit
more than 100 issuers annually has to date received a no-deficiency inspection report.
These 10 firms are inspected yearly. The success of some of the firms who audited no
more than 100 issuers yearly justified the focus on this group.
Letter and Survey Questionnaire
The website for each of the firms in the sample was accessed to determine who was the
head of the firm. In some instances, the information provided was insufficient, so calls
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were made to obtain the name of the managing partner or head of the firm. In only two
instances were letters directed to Managing Partner, with no name.
The covering letter requested a response to a survey questionnaire of 14 questions as well
as the title of the person (s) who responded to the survey. Copies of these two documents
are in Appendix A. The respondents were asked to return the questionnaires by
December 22, 2008. An envelope was enclosed for the response. There was no
identification of responses, so responses were anonymous. A few identified the name of
the person who completed the questionnaire, even though the question asked merely for
the title of the person. There was no second mailing.
Limitations of Survey Questionnaire
Seeking opinions from busy practitioners through a written survey questionnaire is not
the optimum strategy for gaining insight into the thoughts of practitioners. While some
questions allowed for additional comments and a number of respondents did take time to
write additional notes, there continue to be more interesting questions that arise from
such additional notes than are answered..
At best, our exploratory survey provides some clues to current thinking and at the same
time raises some interesting questions for further exploration.
5. Responses of Triennial Firms
The responses were summarized with no statistical testing to determine significance since
this was an exploratory study to gain some general insight about a group of registered
firms that had had at least one no-deficiency inspection report. After requesting
information about the date of registration with the PCAOB, the inspections they had
undergone, how many audits they provided for issuers and for other entities respondents
were asked about the value of the PCAOB inspection process, the PCAOB overall, their
plans for expanding their services to issuers, and expectations for new employees. The
title of the person (s) responding to the questionnaire was to be identified.
At the time of the sample, there were no triennial firms that had been the subject of more
than two inspections. No firm was identified that had a no-deficiency inspection initially
and then a deficiency inspection as the second inspection. (It will be interesting to see
what happens with the 3rd inspection.)
Basic Information about Respondents
While there were 41 responses (35.6 percent), in some instances not every question was
answered. There was no second request sent to the total group. The responses by the
three categories were as follows:
Frequency %
On inspection only and no deficiencies
15
36.6
Two inspections, both with no deficiencies
12
29.3

14
Two inspections, first with deficiencies, second
with no deficiencies
total

14
41

34.1
100.0

The original percentages of the three groups included in the sample are somewhat
different from the percentages of the responses. (No statistical test was used to determine
if differences are significant since this is an exploratory survey investigation.)
The two sets of percentages are:
Percentage
Inspections
In sample In responses
One inspection only, with no deficiencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
46.9
36.6
Two inspections, both with no deficiencies . . . . . . . . . . . ..
20.9
29.3
Two inspections, first with deficiencies,
34.1
second with no deficiencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32.2
100.0
100.0
Total numbers*
115
41
100%

35.6%

*(as noted earlier, in the sample of firms asked to participate, there were 54 one-inspection only firms; 24
two inspection firms; 37 two inspection firms with first one with deficiencies.)

Date of registration
The respondents indicated when they became registered firms. Table 1 reports their
responses. Most of the firms registered during the first or second year of functioning of
the PCAOB.
Table 1
PCAOB Registration Dates of Respondents
N = 41
Year of Registration
2003 (first year of the PCAOB)
2004
2005
2006
2007
No response
Total

Number of Respondents

22
14
3
0
1
1
41

Number of Audits: For Issuers and Others
Respondents were to write in the number of SEC reporting companies (issuers) for
which they had performed financial audits during their most recent fiscal year.
Thirty five of the respondents answered this question. Results are presented in Table 2.
The categories are identified as they are in PCAOB reporting.
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Table 2
Number of Audits of Issuers and Other Entities
N = 35
Audits of Issuers
Five or fewer
6 – 25
26-50
51-100
Over 100*
Total

Audits of other entities

21
11
1
2
0
35

15
12
3
0
5
35

*Not applicable to this group of triennial firms since the group is identified as providing
audits for no more than 100 issuers.
Factors Responsible for No-Deficiencies Inspections
Respondents who had had one or two no-deficiencies inspections were given three factors
to judge as “critical, not critical or not sure” in achieving no-deficiencies inspections.
There was an additional item, “Other: Please describe”. In Table 3 the responses of the
two groups – those who had received a no-deficiencies inspection report for one or two
inspection engagements – who represented 27 of the 41 respondents.
Table 3
Respondents’ Opinion of Critical Factors
in Achieving No-Deficiency Inspection Reports
N = 27
Critical Factors
Critical Not critical Not sure
Audit partner’s skill in team leadership
Level of knowledge/skill of the total audit team
Systematic, timely, and thorough review process

17
23
26

7
0
1

3
4
0

A few comments were added to the open-end 4th item:
a. we limit SEC work only to industries in which we have a high level of expertise.
b. we are careful to limit how many issuers we accept.
c. we have been careful about audit documentation.

Reasons for Deficiencies and Changes Introduced
There were 14 respondents who had had two inspection reports with deficiencies noted in
their first inspection reports. These respondents were asked: 4a: Which of the following
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were the reason (s) for a deficiency (or deficiencies) during the first inspection of our
audits? (Check reasons) In Table 4, are the number of responses to each of the factors.
Table 4
Reasons Identified for Deficiencies by Respondents
N = 14
Audit partner leadership skills inadequate
Weakness in knowledge of relevant GAAP
Inadequate review process

9
10
13

Additionally, respondents made the following comments as reasons for deficiencies in
their first inspection reports:
a. Documentation needed to be enhanced; procedures had been performed in earlier
audits, but had not been completely documented.
b. PCAOB reviewers were very rigid in their review. They didn’t understand the
audit issue and refused to listen to the facts we presented.
c. There was a difference of opinion between the PCAOB inspectors and us that
was not resolved appropriately, we believe.
d. PCAOB was unwilling to accept auditor judgment in addressing audit issues that
arose.
e. In our opinion, the deficiencies cited by the inspection team were, in fact, not
audit deficiencies, but rather differences in opinion of audit workpaper
presentation, and their personal opinions about how a particular audit step should
be completed and evidenced in the audit workpapers.
f. Partner in charge had an overload; concurring review was not properly completed
Summary. As noted, the majority of the 14 respondents checked all three of the factors
as important. The additional comments reveal perceived inadequacies in the relationship
between the firm and inspectors, except for the final one (f) which acknowledges an
overburdened partner.
These 14 respondents were asked the following question: 4b. What changes did you
introduce after receiving the first inspection report? (Check the most important
changes.) The final item was: “Other changes we introduced included”: (Please discuss
briefly) Table 5 indicates the responses to the first four changes:
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Table 5
Changes Made in Audit Performance
N = 14
Changes Introduced

Number of Respondents

We enhanced attention to the audit partner’s role in encouraging
careful adherence to auditing standards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
More orientation provided to all audit teams re their clients. . . . .
Monitored the review process more closely with quick feedback
when problems were identified . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
No specific changes were made . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

6
10
12
2

Additional comments included:
a. Most important change: we developed an audit completion checklist to ascertain strict
compliance with AS #3. instituted a substantial monitoring process to assure
compliance.
b. Added more reliance on PPC standard forms for documentation.
c. Because the PCAOB has significant power, we had no alternative other than to make
changes to how we audited certain areas based on the opinions of those inspectors.
Summary. Good faith implementation of changes is reflected in both the responses to
the structured part of the question and the additional comments, except for c which
reflects willingness to assume that the firm “had no basis for challenging the judgment of
the inspection team.”
Value of PCAOB Inspection Process
Respondents were asked to indicate “agree, disagree, or no opinion” about statements
related to value of the PCAOB inspection process. There was space, also, to add
comments. Table 6 presents respondents’ opinions. Note the extent of agreement with
items 1, 4, and 5. Some additional comments, you will note, relate to these topics. Note
the extent if disagreement to Item 6. Also, again, note the comments related to Item 6,
which, in the end, support the need for inspections.
Table 6
Respondents’ Judgments of Value of PCAPB Inspection Process
N = 41
Number of respondents

Statements

Agree

We found the inspectors knowledgeable, competent, and
fair in their inspection (s). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2. We think the inspection process needs to be redesigned for
both efficiency and effectiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Disagree No opinion

1.

9

3

16

11

18
3. We find the process no more effective than that of the
earlier peer review under the Public Oversight Board. .
4. We would prefer an inspection every five years
rather than every three years. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5. We think the inspection process should require a
sufficient sample of our audits to provide an overall
measure of our audit quality. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6. Inspections aren’t necessary; our commitment to
meeting auditing guidance is sufficient
........

10

25

6

28

8

5

31

5

5

13

24

4

Additional comments related to specific statements included:
Related to Statement 1:
The success of the process lies with the inspection team and their willingness to talk
about documentation options and reporting issues without becoming “police.”
We found inspectors to be generally knowledgeable and competent, but found the
inspections, themselves, to be fairer during their second inspection of our firm, almost as
if they “lightened up” slightly from the first inspection.
The team was there to report on problems but avoided constructive recommendations for
best practices.
An outside agency should periodically review the staff of the PCAOB for competency.
Related to Statement 4:
Some firms should not be inspected every 3 years, if SEC practice is small.
Related to Statement 6:
In general, I believe the inspection process is a good thing because it keeps our firm
members on their toes, and we welcome an inspector’s fair analysis.
Regulatory oversight makes process more serious to many in the firm. (the respondent,
though encircled “no opinion” for the item.)
Regulatory inspections help put all firms on a level playing field. Easier to enforce the
standards internally.
I believe the oversight is important to the profession. Like it or not, as a profession our
audit process was faulty previously.
Very important process, albeit painful.
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Summary: Both the responses to the structured part of the question and the additional
comments reflect varying points of view. There is considerable agreement about the
overall effectiveness of the inspection process and the superiority of the inspection
process when compared with the earlier Public Oversight Board peer review strategy.
However, the opinions related to whether there should be a redesign of the inspection
process or not resulted in a narrow difference between the number who disagree and the
number who agree. A majority agree that there should be a sufficient sample to provide a
measure of overall audit quality. A majority in the end did not agree that “inspections
were unnecessary.” To what extent is the reality reflected in the final comment added:
“Very important process, albeit painful.” Is there a strategy that could be less painful?
Why should there be anxiety about the process? Would a more clearly specified process
with full disclosure of basis for conclusions in an inspection report reduce the “pain?”
Assessment of the PCAOB Overall
Respondents were asked to indicate “agree, disagree, or no opinion” to four statements
about the PCAOB. There was an additional item for the respondent to comment on the
items. Responses are presented in Table 7. There are more agreeing with Statements 1,
3, and 4 than disagreeing. However, Statement 2 was one with which more respondents
disagree than agree.
The responses are somewhat puzzling. While a majority agreed that the inspection
process “meets the compliance requirement,” the respondents in Statement 4 agreed,
again a majority, but to a smaller extent, that an inspection should be a compliance audit.
It may not be surprising that the respondents are not agreeing that the PCAOB be the
audit standard setting since most of the respondents have far more clients who are not
SEC reporting companies and, thus, are required to adhere to two different sets of audit
guidance. The added comments have clues for further consideration and study.
Table 7
Assessment of Selected Factors Related to the PCAOB
N = 41
Number of Respondents

1.
2.

3.

4.

Statements
Agree Disagree No Opinion
The PCAOB is an effective oversight board. . . . . . .
24
12
5
The PCAOB was wise to become the audit standard
setter for those who audit publicly-owned companies
and leave auditing guidance for nonpublic companies
to the Auditing Standards Board. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
26
4
The inspection process we believe meets the SarbanesOxley Act of 2002 requirement that an inspection is to
determine degree of compliance with relevant rules. . 32
6
3
An inspection should be a compliance audit and
conclude with a judgment about firm audit quality
overall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
16
4
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Additional comments included the following:
Related to Statement 1:
PCAOB inspections should be stricter.
There should be better linkage between the planning and field work of the inspectors.
Related to Statement 3:
I think the office based reviews do not allow the PCAOB to assess the expertise and work
ethic of the firm. It is nice to say the workpapers have to stand on their own, but the
individuals conducting the work do matter.
General comment related to both the process and the PCAOB:
Overall our inspection was positive. I think we got lucky with our review team, and it
was done on site. However, the letter that is issued if you fail, which basically states that
you did not gather sufficient evidence to issue an opinion, is offensive. The PCAOB is
too strict in what they expect. I feel as if perfection is the only acceptable level of work.
In summary:
1. Agree PCAOB is necessary and better than the earlier peer review process.
2. Think it is a waste of money to inspect small firms with small clients.
3. Think PCAOB needs to change their evaluation procedures and pass/fail
system
Summary. There are contradictions in responses to the structured part of the question
inasmuch as the majority indicate that the PCAOB is effective, yet a majority believe that
the PCAOB should not have become the audit standard setter. A majority believed that
the inspection meets the expectations of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s requirements, yet a
majority at the same time indicate that the inspection should be a compliance audit.
The additional comments provide clues of possible areas for improvement.
Plans for Providing More Audits of Issuers
There is discussion from time to time about the extent to which smaller registered firms
are capable of handling more audits for issuers (companies that report to the SEC)
The respondents of this survey when asked: Are you interested in providing auditing
services to more SEC clients (issuers) The responses were:
Yes
30
No
8
No response 3
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Those 30 who responded “yes” were asked to write in how many additional issuers could
you serve now? The responses were:
Extent of adding additional clients

Five or fewer new clients
Six to 25 clients
Twenty six to 50 clients
Fifty one to 100 clients
No response
Total

Number of respondents

19
6
2
1
2
30

It is interesting to note that the majority would consider adding no more than five
additional clients. A second question asked: “Are you considering expanding capacity to
handle additional clients (issuers)? Only 14 of the 30 answered “yes” to this question.
The others indicated “no” or did not respond.
Reasons for “not interested in serving more SEC clients (issuers)” were requested in an
open-ended question. Among the responses from the 8 who stated “No.” were:
a. We are currently staffed to handle our three issuers now. Only will take on
another issuer as a replacement, if needed, for a current issuer
b. We want to maintain high quality by just keeping our current SEC clients.
If we take on more jobs, they must be “clean.” Most potential clients are not
“clean.”
c. Staffing is a problem. . .
d. Our firm is small; we want to keep it small
e. Our risk tolerance level doesn’t allow for additional audits of issuers
f. Although our firm welcomes a fair inspection of our audit process, I don’t
trust individual inspectors to be fair for all inspections. Negative comments
in the report, whether true or not, can have a significant negative effect on
our small firm’s practice. Although we had a comment-free report this past
inspection, the comments included in the report from our first inspection
actually prevented us from obtaining a new “non-SEC client. In that
particular case, we were proposing to perform consulting services, not even
relate d to a certified audit. As such, I believe larger firms can weather
negative comments in their reports much easier than smaller firms..
g. Our firm s not large enough to have partner rotation; therefore, we must have
no more than 5 SEC clients.
Summary. The comments reflect a range of attitudes, from awareness that the firm
wishes to maintain high quality to reluctance to take on risk or meet requirements if client
list is larger, to awareness of the problems of obtaining quality staff, to uncertainty about
the repercussions of negative comments in inspections.
Basis for Accepting Issuers
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Respondents were asked: As you consider audit engagements for SEC clients (issuers),
do you have some limit on size of client you accept as measured by revenues?
Twelve of the 41 respondents checked “yes” and indicated a range of revenue cut off
points:
Revenue Cut-off

$20 M
50 M
100 M
500 M
2B
Total

Number of respondents

2
3
4
2
1
12

As noted only three registered small firms indicated a cut-off of $500 Million or more.
Respondents were asked to indicate factors used as a basis for accepting a new SEC
client (issuer).. There was a range of comments about the factor (s) identified in this
open-end question:
Factors Identified

No. of Respondents

Audit risk of potential client
Accounting complexity
Determine factors in case by case
Nature of company; our expertise
Only accept 11-K audits of pension plans
Professional judgment
No answer

6
4
4
4
4
3
4

Summary. The limitation of a questionnaire is highlighted when responses from openend questions are reviewed. In no instance were there explanations of brief comments. It
would be informative to know, for example, what was the nature of accounting
complexity that resulted in declining to accept an audit engagement for an issuer. What
were the factors, as another example, that were components of the professional judgment
made in assessing a potential client?
Industries Considered in Accepting Audits for Issuers
There were 27 (65.9 percent) respondents who answered “yes” when asked if there were
major industries for which they are willing to consider audit engagement. Therefore, 14
respondents (34.1 percent) did not identify specific industries as a basis for considering
an audit engagement. The industries identified were:
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Industries

Number of Respondents

Financial Institutions/banking
5
Manufacturing and Service
5
Pension/retirement plans
4
High tech
3
Mutual Funds
3
Energy, manufacturing, construction
2
Oil and Gas
2
Any industries but not insurance, not banks 3
Total
27
Other Audit Services Provided
Except for one response, all others who answered the question: What audit services,
beyond financial audits, do you provide that are under PCAOB oversight? wrote “none”
The one exceptional was: “none other than two SOX 404 audits.”
Expectations for New Employees
The respondents were given an open-end question: “As you consider your needs in the
years ahead, what do you list as the most critical competencies you seek in new recruits?
The responses were as follows:
Critical Competencies

Number of Respondents

1. Interest in continuing to learn
“ability to learn and comprehend quickly”
“willingness to learn and ask questions?
“ability to ask questions about what they
told”
“desire for life long learning”
2. Written and oral communication skills
“ability to talk with client in
appropriate manner”
“excellent communication skills (written
and oral)
“excellent reading and comprehension
skills”
3. Good work ethic
“willingness to work overtime”
“less focus on personal, feel good
attitude”
“less selfish”
“common sense; business sense”
“willingness to work hard”

21

19

15

24
“desire for profession, not job”
4. Technical knowledge
“industry knowledge”
“strong GAAP knowledge”
“both SEC accounting and IFRs”
“technical and computer proficiency”
5. Analytical skills and critical thinking
6. Integrity, character, ethical

15

9
9

Summary: This question was answered with phrases as are quoted above. Limited
answers reflect that the question was open end and asked for critical competencies. If
competencies had been listed, there is high probability that the listing would be somewhat
different from the one presented here.
Titles of Respondents
The final question was also an open-end question that asked: “ What is the title of the
person (s) who responded to this survey?” In all instances, there was a single title noted.
The responses were as follows:
Titles

Number of respondents

Partner, Senior partner, Managing partner
Shareholder/stockholder
Director of Accounting and Auditing
Head of Department
Manager
No response
Total

23
7
4
3
2
2
41

6. Review of Literature
There has been limited attention to empirical studies of triennial firms of the PCAOB. In
fact, the inspection process has not been broadly studied. However, to illustrate the range
of attention to the topic of triennial firms, two sources were accessed: These were
Google (Triennial firms in the PCAOB) and ABI-Inform. (Small public accounting firms
in the U. S.) A limited number of references are here discussed:
Inspections Do Not Measure Audit Quality
A few studies that have been reported make assumptions about what inspection reports
actually present. In a study by Daugherty, et al, for example, a reference to several other
studies, begins with the comment: Consistent with the view that PCAOB inspection
reports are a powerful signal of audit quality. . . . .and the sentence continues to identify
two studies that built study designs on that assumption. Yet, in every inspection report
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there is a disclaimer that an inspection report is not a basis for determining audit quality
of the firm inspected. (as discussed earlier; see pages 4 and 5)
Daugherty and his research colleagues, though, undertook a study questioning whether
negative outcomes of the PCAOB’s inspection program were associated with triennially
inspected auditing firms no longer being registered with the PCAOB or losing their
publicly-traded clients, either voluntarily or involuntarily. These authors concluded:
:These results suggest that negative inspection outcomes may lead to the smallest
of the triennially inspected firms being involuntarily pushed out of public
company auditing arena. This finding could be viewed as a favorable
consequence of the new audit quality oversight mechanism implemented by the
PCAOB inspection process if the smallest of triennially inspected firms indeed
have the poorest audit quality relative to their larger competitors inspected
triennially. (Daugherty, 11)
There may be justification of equating audit quality with deficiencies or lack of
deficiencies, but there should be some discussion of how the perception was assured in
the presence of the disclaimer about audit quality. Are those making judgments rejecting
the disclaimer stated in inspection reports or do such individuals know the disclaimer but
believe that what is presented as deficiencies provides evidence related to audit quality in
the firm? Further study of how readers of inspection reports interpret of what is
provided in an inspection report would be of value.
First and Second Inspections of Triennial Firms
Hermanson, et.al examined 316 PCAOB inspection reports issued to smaller (triennial)
firms through July 2006. They found that 60 percent had audit deficiencies. They found
that firms who had deficiencies were smaller, had a larger number of clients and were
growing more rapidly than those firms that received no-deficiency inspection reports.
There was no reference to the fact that such inspections do not follow a standardized
strategy, so the evaluation of inspections among those inspected has serious limitations.
(Hermanson, et. al. PCAOB Inspections of Smaller CPA Firms. . . . )
A followup study of 116 second inspection reports of small firms (as of October 23,
2008) was conducted by Hermanson and Houston to determine whether smaller audit
firms have “made improvements in their processes as a result of the PCAOB inspection
process.”
There results showed that the results “were much more favorable” the second time a
small firm was inspected. This result “appears to be attributable to smaller audit firms
learning from their first inspections and improving their audit procedures, rather than a
softening of the PCAOB posture.” (Hermanson, Evidence from the PCAOB. . . ) This
statement is supported by the results of our exploratory survey. (see page 16)
Improved Grade for Timeliness
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A study of the time lapse between an inspection and the date an inspection report is
issued was completed by Roybark. . Articles in the business press had noted the lack of
timeliness in reporting in a number of instances. In the report of the study, Roybark
presented a table showing the mean number of days from last date in field to report date.
She presented disaggregated data for: 1. all triennial firm; 2. those with audit
deficiencies; and 3. those with no audit deficiencies. In all instances the time lapse has
decreased markedly. (for all firms, from 398 days in 2004 to 156 in 2007; for those with
deficiencies, from 416 to 221; for those without deficiencies, 272 to 150. There was
improvement for all sizes of inspected firms between the beginning and ending dates,
though there were some increases in years between 2004 and 2007. (Roybark, 66)
The PCAOB and the Smaller Firms
In the PCAOB’s Strategic Plan for 2008 – 2013, there is a discussion of challenges
including one refers to smaller firms:
Firms of different sizes present different challenges to the PCAOB ad risks to the
investing public. While difficult to generalize, smaller firms do not have
sufficient resources to invest in the technical skills and quality controls necessary
to be able to audit large or multi-national clients. In addition, resource constrains,
as well as lack of opportunity and experience, have prevented smaller firms from
diversifying their practices the way larger firms have been able to do. At the
same time, a smaller firm may be able to devote relatively more senior-;level
attention to a client than a large firm. Moreover, a smaller firm, which focuses on
one industry and has developed an expertise in audits of that industry, may, in
fact, provide higher quality audits in that particular area than a larger firm with no
particular expertise in that area. The PCAOB’s strength in addressing the
challenges associated with both these small firms as well as larger firms is its
ability to tailor its programs to address differences in the size and nature of firms.
(PCAOB, Strategic Plan. . )
The foregoing appears to be a collection of opinions – potential hypotheses. There are no
references to systematic investigation of how behavior of auditors in smaller firms differ
from those in mid-size and large firms. The PCAOB has valuable data for empirical
studies of triennial firms.
An initiative provided by the PCAOB, The Forum on Auditing in the Small Business
Environment, is for registered smaller accounting and public companies. The Forum, for
example, has planned six one day meetings in 2009 in six locations across the United
States. Agenda items deal with current issues and trends that impact audits to the
inspection process and new auditing standards.
The General Accountability Office Study of Public Accounting Firms
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A comprehensive report related to concentration in audits of public companies revealed
some shifts in changes in which public accounting firms are participating in auditing
publicly-owned companies.
From January 2003 to June 2007, the largest firms had a net loss of 1,149 clients; while
midsize firms had a net increase of 282 clients, and smaller firms had a net increase of
867, Noted in the report was the following:
. . . despite the largest firms experiencing a net loss of over one thousand clients,
most of these were smaller companies with lower revenues and audit fees. .
Companies that changed from one of the largest firms to another had average
revenues of over $1 billion, while companies that changed from one of the largest
firms to a smaller firm had average revenues of just over $60 million. (GAO, 83)
In a discussion of disincentives and challenges to entering the large public company audit
market, the response of 75 percent of smaller firms surveyed said they were not
interested in serving as auditor for additional large public companies.
In the survey reported in this paper, a comparable question was not asked. However,
thirty of the 41 who participated in the survey indicated an interest in serving more
issuers. A specific question about the audit of large public companies was not asked,
although a question about revenue cut off was asked; only 12 responded, with 7
indicating revenue cutoffs of $100M or $500 M or $2 B. (See page 22)
The Report revealed that the largest accounting firms audit 98 percent of the more than
1,500 largest public companies; these have annual revenues of more than $1B. At the
same time, smaller firms audit 69 percent of the more than 3,600 smallest companies;
these have revenues of less than $100M. (Note: Triennial firms are those who audit
100 or fewer SEC clients; revenues is not basis for cutoff)
While 82 percent of the Fortune 1000 companies saw their choice of auditor as limited to
three or fewer firms and about 60 percent viewed competition in their audit market as
insufficient, most small public companies reported being satisfied with the auditor
choices available to them. (GAO, 2) The shift between 2002 and 2006 for auditing
public companies with revenues of $100M - %500M indicates the following:
Segment of Accounting Firms

2002

Largest firms
Midsize firms
Smaller firms

90%
6%
5%

2006
71%
16%
13%

However, for publicly-owned companies with revenues greater than $1B, the largest
firms continued to be the auditors (98 percent in both 2002 and 2006) and for larger
public companies with revenues greater than $500M (95% revenues in 2002 and 92% in
2006) .
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The GAO team responsible for the investigation considered proposals by academics and
business groups to reduce risks of current and further audit market concentration. In the
end, they concluded that the evidence was limited “that the currently concentrated market
has created significant adverse impact” and thus, they concluded “we found no
compelling need to take action.” The GAO does not reveal the basis of their judgment.
Possibly, the shift in who is providing audits for the smaller publicly-owned companies,
as noted in the figures above, was one factor in concluding that no action needed to be
recommended at this point.
The role of the midsize and smaller firms in the future will be worthy of study in
innovative, objective ways. There are undoubtedly opportunities for expansion.
Summary: Possibly, the most critical factors about the inspection process (described as
the core oversight responsibility of the PCAOB) have yet to be empirically studied. The
limited references identified in the search for related literature did not reveal concern
with basic issues. For example, a supervisory approach to oversight with a standard
strategy for determining compliance needs to be rigorously studied. Inasmuch, as noted
in inspection reports, inspectors make judgments about what areas of audits will be
reviewed in an inspection engagement, there is no disclosure that a random sample is
taken, there is no assurance of consistency among inspections for a single year or year
after year. It must be underscored that the inspection reports clearly indicate the
limitations in interpreting what is presented.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 states that the inspection is for the purpose of
determining compliance. Standard, consistent, assessment measures are typically
present in determining compliance.
The process for PCAOB inspections, as described
in the first annual report issued by the PCAOB, noted that a supervisory approach was the
strategy for an inspection. Such a strategy appears more relevant for a consulting
engagement than a compliance engagement.
Ultimately, an oversight process for audits should result in a determination of audit
quality. To date there is no basis for making any judgment about “progress” in enhancing
audit quality in the performance of audits of publicly-owned companies. To continue to
rely, for example, on the number of deficiencies reported from an engagement as a
measure of effectiveness about a firm’s performance of audits does not seem warranted..
To date, there has been no disclosure of the PCAOB’s concern about the adequacy of its
strategy for inspection engagements. Possibly, the Research and Analysis Office is
undertaking such an investigation.
7. Summary and Reflections on Responses
As noted initially this was an exploratory survey to gain an initial view of audit
performance of a sample from the group of registered firms who had received one or two
inspection reports that had no deficiencies. They are a minority of the total population of
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registered firms who have been inspected since full inspections began in 2004. At the
time the sample was drawn there were no triennial firms that had had more than two
inspections.
The largest four firms had limited inspections in 2003 and inspections yearly since that
year. The next 6 largest firms have had annual inspections since 2004. To date none of
these annually inspected firms has received a no-deficiency inspection report.
Summary
Executives of 41 (35.6 percent) triennial firms of the 115 to whom requests were mailed
responded to the questionnaire. Respondents from each of the three subgroups were: 15
with one inspection, which revealed no deficiencies; 12 with two inspections with no
deficiencies; and 14 with two inspections, with the first disclosing deficiencies and the
second without deficiencies.
1. Factors perceived critical for achieving no-deficiency audits accepted by the
respondents were: 1. Systematic, timely and thorough review process; 2. Level of
knowledge/skill of the total audit team and; 3. audit partner’s skill in team leadership.
2. A majority of respondents concurred the reasons for deficiencies were 1. inadequate
review process, 2. weaknesses in knowledge of relevant GAAP and 3. audit partner
leadership skills inadequate.
3. Those with deficiencies in their first inspections implemented changes which resulted
in no-deficiency second inspections.
4. While there was agreement among the respondents that an inspection process is
necessary and most agreed that the PCAOB was effective, there was disagreement, to
some extent, about the need for an inspection of triennial firms every three years and
about the PCAOB choosing to be audit standard setter for registered firms auditing SEC
clients (issuers).
5. Far more of the respondents are interested in serving more issuers than they are
currently serving a limited additional number of SEC clients , there were eight who said
that they are not interested in expanding their services to issuers.
6. Critical competencies highlight the importance of meeting changing demands with the
most commonly identified critical competency (21 respondents of 41) noted that new
recruits must be interested in continuing to learn.
Reflections on Opinions Expressed by Triennial Firms’ Respondents
There is an acceptance of the need for an oversight function for public accountants who
audit SEC clients. However, among the responses and additional comments are clues
that indicate that the inspection process is not as effective as it should be.
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Questions yet to be answered:
1. Is the supervisory approach sufficient to enhance audit quality?
2. How much disclosure should there be when there are differences between the firm
under inspection and the PCAOB inspection team?
3. While a majority noted that the PCAOB is an effective oversight board, a majority at
the same time did not believe that the PCAOB should have become the audit
standard setter. Why did they not think the PCAOB should be the audit standard
setter? Did they believe here was a conflict of interest? Did they question the
independence of the standard setting responsibility in the presence of making
judgments about the implementation of auditing standards by the registered firms?
There has been heightened attention to the importance of good internal controls, yet
a newly established oversight board assumed standard setting responsibilities (these
were not mandated by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, but could be assumed by the
PCAOB). There has been no discussion of this clearly questionable overlap of
responsibilities if assurance of good faith review of auditing standards was to be
achieved.
4.

Is there a need for a compliance style audit that concludes with an assessment of a
firm’s performance of audits? Possibly, the most puzzling opinions were related to
the responses to two statements in Question 7 that the inspection process meets the
expectations of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 requirement, a majority also agreed
that the inspection should be a compliance audit.

.
As noted in the summary of the preceding section of this paper, much more detailed study
is needed to resolve the contradictory opinions and to determine the effective of the
current inspection process. The PCAOB’s inspection process needs an objective,
comprehensive assessment.
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Appendix A
(Copy of the letter sent to the 115 firms)

Name
Address

Your opinion about the PCAOB inspection process and related topics are of interest to us.
Your firm is unique: it is among the minority of registered firms that have achieved
deficiency-free inspection reports. We believe your experience in achieving quality
audits would be of value to many interested in enhancing audit quality in our society. .
We have selected a random sample of 115 firms from the listings of inspection reports
posted at the PCAOB website. (as of early November). These selected firms have had at
least one deficiency-free audit; some selected have had two deficiency-free audits; some
had an initial audit with deficiencies but a second one without deficiencies.
The enclosed survey is to be answered anonymously. There is to be no identification of
your firm. In addition to questions about the inspection process, there are questions
related to some of the PCAOB responsibilities. Any additional comments about other
aspects of the PCAOB’s responsibilities are welcome.
If possible, we hope you will participate in this survey investigation and forward your
responses in the enclosed envelope by December 22.. If you have any questions, send
an email or call one of us.
We thank you for considering our request. We applaud your fine performance as auditors
and we extend our best wishes to you and your firm for continuing success in this
challenging economic environment.
Sincerely

Enclosures: Survey form; return self-addressed envelope
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(Copy of the survey questionnaire that was sent to 115 firms)

Your Opinion: PCAOB Inspection Process and Related Matters
As noted in the covering letter, your firm has received one or two deficiency-free
inspection reports. Your responses are valuable in our gaining insight as efforts to
enhance audit quality are underway. Please know that your responses are totally
anonymous; candid responses are deeply appreciated.
1. In what year did you become a registered firm with the PCAOB?_________.
2. Your firm has been inspected (please check)
2.1 ________once only; with no deficiencies
2.2 ________twice, both with no deficiencies
2.3 _______ twice, first with deficiencies; second, without deficiencies

If you checked 2.1 or 2.2, please respond to Question 3; if you checked 2.3,
please respond to Question 4.
3. (for No- deficiencies firms)What factors directly related to the audit performance do
you believe were critical in assuring no deficiencies identified by inspectors. Indicate
whether or not critical for each factor:.
(encircle one opinion)
3.1 audit partner’s skill in team leadership
Critical Not critical Not sure
3.2 level of knowledge/skill of the total audit team Critical Not critical Not sure
3.3 systematic, timely, and thorough review process Critical Not critical Not sure
3.4 Other (please identify factors that are also critical)
________________________________________________________________________
4. (for firms with deficiencies during first PCAOB inspection)
4a: Which of the following were the reason (s) for a deficiency (or deficiencies)
during the first inspection of our audits? (Check reasons)
_____ audit partner leadership skills inadequate
_____ weakness in knowledge of relevant GAAP
_____ inadequate review process
______Other: please describe: ________________________________:
_________________________________________________________
4b. What changes did you introduce after receiving the first inspection report?
(Check the most important changes.
______ We enhanced attention to the audit partner’s role in encouraging
careful adherence to auditing standards
_____ More orientation provided to all audit teams re their clients
_____ Monitored the review process more closely with quick feedback

35
when problems were identified
______ No specific changes were made
______ Other changes we introduced included: (Please discuss briefly)
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________
5. How many financial audits did your firm perform during your most recent fiscal
Year? Indicate number for SEC reporting companies (Issuers)__________
Indicate number for privately held companies__________________

Value of PCAOB Inspection Process
6. Indicate whether you agree, disagree, or have no opinion with each of the following
statements:
(Encircle response)
6.1 We found the inspectors knowledgeable, competent, and
fair in their inspection (s). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
agree disagree no opinion
6.2 We think the inspection process needs to be redesigned for
both efficiency and effectiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
agree disagree no opinion
6.3 We find the process no more effective than that of the
earlier peer review under the Public Oversight Board. .
agree disagree no opinion
6.4 We would prefer an inspection every five years
rather than every three years. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
agree disagree no opinion
6.5 We think the inspection process should require a
sufficient sample of our audits to provide an overall
measure of our audit quality. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
agree disagree no opinion
6.6 Inspections aren’t necessary; our commitment to
meeting auditing guidance is sufficient
........
agree disagree no opinion
6.7 (Other) Please discuss briefly any other comments about the inspection
process:________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________
Note: Further comment re any of the above you encircled “disagree” is welcome.
(attach a sheet to this form)

The PCAOB OVERALL
7.. Indicate whether you agree, disagree, or have no opinion with each of the following
statements:
(Encircle response)
7.1 The PCAOB is an effective oversight board. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . agree disagree no opinion
7.2 The PCAOB was wise to become the audit standard setter
for those who audit publicly-owned companies and leave
auditing guidance for nonpublic companies to the Auditing
Standards Board. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . agree disagree no opinion
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7.3 The inspection process we believe meets the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002 requirement that an inspection is to determine
degree of compliance with relevant rules. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . agree disagree no opinion
7.4 An inspection should be a compliance audit and conclude with a
judgment about firm audit quality overall
. . . . . . . . . agree disagree no opinion
7.5 (Other) Please discuss briefly comments related to any aspect of the PCAOB_____
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
Note: further comment re any of the above you encircled “disagree” is welcome.
(attach a sheet to this form)

Your Plans for Providing More Audits of Issuers
8.

Are you interested in provided auditing services to more SEC client (issuers)?
__________Yes
___________No

9.

a. If you checked “Yes” how many additional issuers could you serve now?
____________
b. Are you considering expanding capacity to handle additional issuers?
___________________________________________________________

10. If you checked “No” in response to 8, why are you not interested in serving more
SEC clients (issuers)? _____________________________________________
_________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
11. As you consider audit engagements for SEC clients (issuers), do you have some
limit on size of client you accept as measured by revenues?
______Yes, we have a cut off at $_______________
_____No, we use (indicate factor) _______________as a basis for determining
acceptance of an issuer.
12.

As you consider audit engagements for issuers, do you choose firms from certain
industries?
______Yes, primarily from (identify major industries for which you
are willing to consider engagements)____________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
_____No, we do not consider the industry in making our decision about acceptance
of an issuer who seeks an auditor.

13. What audit services, beyond financial audits, do you provide that are under PCAOB
oversight?__________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
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Expectations for New Employees
14. As you consider your needs in the years ahead, what do you list as the most critical
competencies you seek in new recruits?_______________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________

What is the title of the person (s) who responded to this survey?
_________________________________________________________

As noted earlier, additional comments are welcome; attach pages for such
comments. We thank you for your response.
Return by December 22 in enclosed envelope to:

